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Abstract Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally impli-
cated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims
in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties con-
fronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such
claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a
singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set
out Trueman’s argument for this claim, identifying and remedying some omissions
and errors of formulation therein. I then develop a response to the argument by
showing, pace Trueman, that it is possible—and how it is possible—to express
identities between objects and concepts.
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… Coriolanus
He would not answer to: forbad all names;
He was a kind of nothing, titleless,
Till he had forged himself a name o’ the fire
Of burning Rome.
Coriolanus, Act V, Scene I
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Frege’s concept horse paradox has enjoyed a swell of interest in recent years.1 One
of the highlights of this latest tranche of research on the paradox is Robert
Trueman’s ‘The concept horse with no name’ (Trueman 2015). Trueman presents
an impressive and innovative defense of Frege’s rejection of singular reference to
concepts—a defense that, importantly, forgoes appeal to Wright’s ill-fated
Reference Principle, which has played such a central role in discussions of the
justification of Frege’s position on the topic.2 The rejection of singular reference to
concepts is, of course, centrally implicated in the constellation of problems gathered
under the rubric ‘the concept horse paradox’.3 I shan’t rehearse those problems in
any detail here. My main concern will be with what can be said—and, in particular,
with what Trueman has said—in defense of Frege’s rejection of singular reference
to concepts.
1 Frege against singular reference to concepts
First, though, some remarks are in order concerning what that rejection amounts to.
It strikes me that there are, in fact, four claims discernible in Frege’s writings in
each of which his rejection of singular reference to concepts might be taken to
consist. The first is that reference to a concept with a singular term is impossible
(‘the impossibility thesis’): concepts are unnameable. Following Frege in counting
something an object just in case it can be the referent of a singular term, and in
counting something a concept (or property) just in case it can be the referent of a
predicate, the impossibility thesis can alternatively be formulated as follows:
concepts are not objects; or again as follows: singular terms and predicates cannot
be pairwise co-referential. The impossibility thesis is, I think, the view on the matter
standardly attributed to Frege, and on good textual grounds. We find it clearly
affirmed in the following passage, for example:
… the phrase ‘is a concept’ requires a proper name as grammatical subject;
and so, strictly speaking, it requires something contradictory, since no proper
name can designate a concept… (Frege 1979b, p. 178, my emphasis)4
Yet there is reason to doubt that the impossibility thesis is Frege’s most considered
position on the matter. What immediately follows the passage just quoted, for
example, appears to amount to a cautious recantation of the impossibility thesis just
affirmed:
1 Notable recent contributions to the topic include Hale (2010), Hale and Wright (2012), Hale (2013,
Hale and Linnebo (TS), Jolley (2007), MacBride (2011), Noonan (2006), Proops (2013), Rayo (TS),
Textor (2010) and Trueman (2015).
2 A powerful case against the Reference Principle is presented in Oliver (2005).
3 For an excellent discussion of the distinguishable difficulties see Proops (2013).
4 I remind the reader that all singular terms count as proper names on Frege’s use of ‘proper name’
(indeed he uses ‘proper name’ (Eigenname) interchangeably with ‘singular term’ (Einzelname): see Frege
(1997a, p. 172). The expression ‘unnameable’ in this essay is to be understood as a cognate of Frege’s
‘proper name’: something is unnameable just in case it cannot be the referent of a Fregean proper name.
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… or perhaps better still, something nonsensical. (ibid.)
Better than saying that singular reference to concepts is impossible, Frege ventures,
is to say that there is no sense to be made of reference to a concept with a singular
term. This latter is the second claim I have in mind: it is nonsense to say that a
concept might be the referent of a singular term, nonsense to say that a concept is an
object (‘the nonsensicality thesis’). The third is that it is impossible to think of a
concept as being the referent of a singular term—impossible to suppose that a
concept is an object (‘the unthinkability thesis’). This follows from Frege’s general
pronouncement that
… concepts cannot stand in the same relations as objects. It would not be false,
but impossible to think of them as doing so. (Frege 1997a, p. 175),
since to think of a concept as being the referent of a singular term would be to think
of a concept as standing in a relation in which objects stand. The fourth claim is that
it is impossible to state that a concept is an object (‘the inexpressibility thesis’). In
‘On Concept and Object’, Frege insists that
… what is suitably stated of the concept does not suit the object … I do not
want to say it is false to state concerning an object what is stated here
concerning a concept; I want to say it is impossible, senseless, to do so. (Frege
1997c, p. 188–9, translation altered)
Since, in particular, it is possible to state concerning an object that it is an object, it
seems clear that Frege deemed it impossible to state concerning a concept that it is
an object. The import of ‘senseless’ in this passage is made more explicit in an
earlier draft of the paper:
… a sentence which tried to express such a thing [i.e. which tried to do the
impossible and state concerning a concept what can be stated concerning an
object] would be absolutely devoid of sense;… (Frege 1979a, p. 109)
Since ‘A concept is an object’ is presumably just such a sentence, we have here a
further affirmation of the nonsensicality thesis.
Of these four theses, each of which constitutes a position on which singular
reference to concepts is rejected, three face an exigent threat of self-stultification. The
threat is perhaps most conspicuous in the case of the inexpressibility thesis. Saying ‘It
is impossible to state that a concept is an object’ is liable to be compared to saying out
loud (and with correct pronunciation) ‘I cannot pronounce the word ‘‘banana’’’.5
Merely voicing the thesis appears to expose it as false. A similar problem attends the
unthinkability thesis: if we are even to understand the thesis, we must be in a position
to apprehend just what it is that is being claimed unthinkable, and such apprehension
threatens to demand the very thinkability of the subject of the claim. The problem is
that identified in the preface of the Tractatus: ‘in order to set a limit to thinking we
should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be
5 The example is Peter Sullivan’s (Sullivan 2002, p. 76), though he deploys it to illustrate a different
point.
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able to think what cannot be thought)’ (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 27). The impossibility
thesis faces a charge of self-stultification too. In this case the problem is the one
acknowledged by Frege in our first quotation above: ‘n is a concept’ requires a
singular term to fill its argument place; it is extremely natural to suppose that where a
predicate truly applies to something, there could, in principle, be a true sentence
consisting of an expression referring to that thing in the argument place of that
predicate; but in that case, anything to which ‘n is a concept’ does truly apply is
something to which a singular term can, in principle, refer—i.e. an object; but ‘n is a
concept’ truly applies to something just in case it is a concept; so anything that is a
concept is an object; granted that there are concepts, as Frege maintains, it follows
that it is false that no concept is an object. This kind of problem is, of course, one
distinguishable dimension of the concept horse paradox (Proops 2013, p. 84–85).
The nonsensicality thesis stands out on this count, I submit: it is innocent of self-
stultification. For it must be understood as a claim about a certain linguistic
expression, ‘a concept is an object’, and as being to the effect that that expression
lacks sense—i.e. expresses no thought (this is the relevant notion of nonsensicality in
the present context). (Better: it must be understood as claim about a cluster of
linguistic expressions—‘a concept is an object’, ‘a concept can be the referent of a
singular term’, ‘a singular term can co-refer with a predicate’, etc.—that are, by virtue
of our semantic stipulations, possessed of the same sense if possessed of sense at all.)
As Wittgenstein stressed, ‘[w]hen a sentence is called senseless, it is not, as it were, its
sense that is [being claimed] senseless’ (Wittgenstein 2010, p. 147e); it is the sentence
itself. Accordingly, when we formulate the thesis as ‘It is nonsense to say that a
concept is an object’, the sentence ‘a concept is an object’ therein must be understood
as mentioned and not used. Mentioned nonsense, as opposed to used nonsense, is
quarantined: it does not infect its surroundings with nonsensicality. So the thesis can
simply be true, much as it can simply be true to say ‘Finally Carroll said ‘‘And the
mome raths outgrabe’’’.6 Whereas the inexpressibility of a thought threatens to render
it inexpressible that that thought is inexpressible, so that one’s success in stating that
that thought is inexpressible would confute that very statement, and whereas the
unthinkability of a thought threatens to render it unthinkable that that thought is
unthinkable, so that one’s success in supposing that that thought is unthinkable would
confute that very supposition, the nonsensicality of a sentence, by contrast, does not
risk rendering it nonsensical to say that that sentence is nonsensical; so one’s success
in sensefully saying so does not confute one’s saying.7
6 See also Moore (1997, p. 157).
7 The two uses of ‘threatens’ in this sentence may look like undue caution. One reason I think caution is
due, however, is that there are ways of referring to and apprehending thoughts that do not require the
expressibility or thinkability of those thoughts. Suppose, for example, that the truth fathomed by
Siddha¯rtha Gautama on the night of his enlightenment is inexpressible and unthinkable (at least to the
benighted likes of us). That that truth is inexpressible and unthinkable, though, need be neither
inexpressible nor unthinkable (even to us), providing that truth can be referred to, and apprehended under,
the definite description in the preceding sentence. It is quite unclear, however, how this expedient for
making inexpressibility claims and unthinkability claims respectively expressible and thinkable (even if




2 Trueman against singular reference to concepts
If one is going to argue for a Fregean rejection of singular reference to concepts,
there are, then, prima facie grounds for arguing for it in the form of the
nonsensicality thesis. This is what Trueman does. The conclusion of his paper is
‘that it is nonsense to say that a property is an object’ (Trueman 2015, §8).
(Trueman favours ‘property’ over ‘concept’; we’ll switch to the former in what
follows to accord with his formulations.) Interestingly, though, he sets about
establishing that conclusion by arguing, in the first instance, for the inexpressibility
thesis: we are prevented, in principle, he argues, ‘from so much as expressing the
thought that a property is an object’ (Trueman 2015, §3). If, for the moment, we
prescind from the self-stultification problem afflicting it, the inexpressibility thesis
does look fit to serve as intermediate conclusion en route to the nonsensicality
thesis. For suppose that, contrary to the nonsensicality thesis, it does make sense to
say that a property is an object—i.e. that one does succeed in expressing a thought
in saying so. Whatever thought is thereby expressed is, trivially, not inexpressible;
but, ‘It is impossible to express that a property is an object’ says of that thought that
it is inexpressible, and is thus false. If ‘It is impossible to express that a property is
an object’ is false, then it is not impossible to express that a property is an object. So
if it makes sense to say that a property is an object, it is possible to express that a
property is an object. By contraposition, if it is not possible to express that a
property is an object, then it is nonsense to say that a property is an object: the
inexpressibility thesis implies the nonsensicality thesis.8,9
However, even ignoring the self-stultification of the inexpressibility thesis, we
are now confronted with the fresh oddity that the inexpressibility thesis is stultified
by the conclusion for which it serves as lemma—the nonsensicality thesis: after all,
‘a property is an object’ is used, not mentioned, in ‘it is impossible to express that a
property is an object’; so, if the former is nonsense, the latter is too. But if the latter
is nonsense, how can it serve as a lemma en route to the nonsensicality thesis?
Trueman acknowledges that he is in ‘a precarious dialectical position’ (Trueman
2015, §8). He denies that his position need be ‘ultimately unstable’, however. The
argument is to be understood, according to Trueman, as an attempt to show his
opponents—those who think it does make sense to say that a property is an object—
by their own lights that it does not make sense. It need not, to that end, succeed in
8 Cf. Moore (1997, p. 198).
9 The unthinkability thesis also features in Trueman’s paper. Like the nonsensicality thesis, it is affirmed
as a consequence of the inexpressibility thesis: ‘‘unless we can find a way of expressing Benno’s thought
[the thought that a certain concept is an object], we cannot suppose that it might actually be true’’
(Trueman 2015, §4). The inference of the unthinkability thesis from the inexpressibility thesis is mediated
by a ‘ground rule’ Trueman lays down (Trueman 2015, §4) of not entertaining the suggestion that the
thinkable outstrips the expressible. Though my main focus in this paper will be with Trueman’s argument
for the inexpressibility thesis as intermediate conclusion en route to the nonsensicality thesis, what I say
will equally bear on whether Trueman has established the unthinkability thesis via the same route.
Incidentally, Trueman ascribes the unthinkability thesis to Frege, claiming that ‘he was clear’ that this
thesis was ‘the proper formulation of his position’ (Trueman 2015, §4). I suggest that the brief survey of
relevant passages in Sect. 1 does not in fact disclose a single, official formulation of Frege’s position.
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showing this by the lights of those sharing his view, who indeed need not (and as
we’ve seen, cannot) even accept the meaningfulness of the argument.
For what it is worth, I’m sympathetic to Trueman’s response. We should, I
believe, recognize the legitimacy of arguments that are only intelligible by the lights
of those on whose position they are an attack. Such arguments are, I think, just
extreme examples of good ad hominem arguments: arguments whose cogency
depends upon assumptions accepted by opponents of, but not proponents of, the
view they are intended to support. In any case, it is not with the ultimate stability of
Trueman’s dialectical position that I shall take issue here. Rather, my concern is to
argue that Trueman does not show, even by his opponent’s lights, that it is
impossible to express that a property is an object. Let us turn, then, to the details of
the argument that purports to show that.
2.1 The basic argument
Suppose that it is possible, in principle, to express the general thought that a
property is an object—or equivalently, that a property is identical to some object.
(Throughout, ‘a property is an object’ is to be understood as an existential
generalisation—i.e. as ‘some property is an object’—rather than a universal
generalisation or a generic; similarly for its equivalents.) In that case, it must also be
possible, in principle, to express the thought (call it Benno’s thought, in honour of
Frege’s critic) that a particular property—say, the one ‘n is a horse’ refers to—is
identical to a particular object—say, the one ‘the property horse’ refers to. Benno’s
thought is an identity, so the natural way to attempt to express it is by use of the
identity predicate, ‘n = f’. But while ‘the property horse’ can be introduced into an
argument place of the identity predicate, ‘n is a horse’, whose referent we wish to
identify with the property horse, cannot be introduced into the remaining argument
place. The point is not, Trueman is keen to stress, merely that the parochial
grammatical strictures of English forbid substituting ‘n is a horse’ for ‘n’ in
‘n = the property horse’. Rather, the kind of sense possessed by ‘n is a horse’, qua
predicate, is such that, unlike a singular term, it cannot combine solely with
‘n = the property horse’, given the kind of sense it has, to yield the expression of a
thought. This, Trueman thinks, is just a consequence of the general consideration
that the contrasting kinds of sense respectively possessed by terms and predicates
prevent them from being substituted for one another.
If we are to express Benno’s thought, then, we must complete ‘n = the property
horse’ with a singular term. Clearly, we must select one that co-refers with ‘n is a
horse’. Let ‘a’ be whichever such term we select. The problem, however, Trueman
claims, is that even if ‘a’ indeed co-refers with ‘n is a horse’ (and to assume that it
could not, or that it is nonsense to say that it does, would be to beg the question in
the present context), ‘a = the property horse’ will nevertheless fail to express
Benno’s thought. The reason is that ‘a’, qua singular term, will not present its
referent in the right way—namely, as a property, something to which predicate
reference can be made. Trueman illustrates this point by way of comparison with the
following case. Suppose that there is a philosopher, the Misguided Metaphysician,
who maintains that the number 3 is identical to Julius Caesar. The Misguided
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Metaphysician attempts to express that view not with the sentence ‘Julius
Caesar = 3’ but rather by saying ‘2 ? 1 = 3’. The natural verdict is that the
Misguided Metaphysician’s attempt to express her claim in this way is unsuccessful.
Moreover, her attempt would be unsuccessful even if she were right, and ‘2 ? 1’
did indeed refer to Julius Caesar. If she were right, her utterance would say de re of
Julius Caesar that he is identical to the number 3; but her utterance would
nevertheless fail to express the thought that Julius Caesar is identical to the number
3. This is witnessed by our being able to accept what the Misguided Metaphysician
says without agreeing with her that Julius Caesar and the number 3 are identical.
Trueman’s diagnosis of the failure is that ‘2 ? 1’, even if it refers to Julius Caesar,
does not present its referent as Julius Caesar. The attempt to use the sentence
‘a = the property horse’ to express Benno’s thought is comparable, Trueman
thinks, to the Misguided Metaphysician’s attempt to express her thought using
‘2 ? 1 = 3’. Benno’s thought is that a certain property—something that can feature
as the referent of a predicate—is identical to a certain object. But the singular term
‘a’, even if it succeeds in picking out the intended property, does not present its
referent as something to which predicate reference can be made. Thus, while
‘a = the property horse’ may succeed in saying de re of the referent of ‘n is a horse’
that it is identical to a certain object, it nevertheless fails to express Benno’s
thought. In order, Trueman thinks, to present the property we wished to identify
with an object as a property, we would have to refer to it with a predicate. But we
cannot both do this and employ the predicate ‘n = the property horse’ to express
Benno’s thought. Quite generally, we cannot do this and employ the identity sign
‘n = f’, or any expression with the same sense, to express Benno’s thought: ‘n = f’
requires—once again, as a matter of sense—that each of its argument places be
supplied with a singular term. But then how can Benno’s thought be expressed?
Conclusion: it cannot. And if it cannot, nor can the general thought that a property is
an object.
2.2 Can’t terms present their referents as properties?
Trueman considers two broad kinds of objection to this argument. The first is to the
effect that a singular term can present its referent as a property, so that Benno’s
thought can after all be expressed by use of the identity predicate. The second is to
the effect that Benno’s thought admits of expression without use of the identity
predicate, by some means that allows for the use of ‘n is a horse’ itself to pick out
the property to be identified with an object, rather than a surrogate singular term. I
shall, in fact, ultimately push versions of both these objections against Trueman’s
argument, though my version of the second objection will be quite different from
the version Trueman treats and will, in a sense, be parasitic upon my defense of the
first objection.10 Let us then, give substance to the first objection and hear
Trueman’s response to it.
10 The version of the second objection Trueman discusses consists in the proposal that Benno’s thought
can be stated by means of a lopsided analogue of the identity predicate, ‘U * n’, admitting a predicate
into one argument place and a term into the other. I shan’t pursue this proposal here.
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Two terms that do appear to present their referent as a property, and are excellent
candidates for co-referring with ‘n is a horse’, are ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’
and ‘the property horse’. It appears that the latter quite explicitly presents its
referent as a property, while the former presents its referent as a property—
something to which a predicate can refer—by presenting it as something to which a
particular predicate does refer. If we substitute either for ‘a’ in ‘a = the property
horse’, won’t the result suffice to express Benno’s thought? For closely related
reasons Trueman thinks neither expression is fit to task.
I shall focus on ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’. This looks like a singular term,
one naturally analysed as the result of using a definite description operator to bind a
term variable in the argument place of the predicate ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to f’,
where this predicate is in turn the result of inserting the predicate name ‘‘‘n is a
horse’’’ into the first argument place of ‘n refers to f’.11 The problem with this
analysis, Trueman thinks, is that ‘refers’, used when speaking of predicates
referring, should not be understood as the very same first-level dyadic predicate, ‘n
refers to f’, used when speaking of terms referring. The reason has to do with the
possibility of specifying, by disquotation, what an expression refers to. Disquotation
sentences like
(i) The referent of ‘Julius Caesar’ = Julius Caesar
capture, Trueman maintains, something essential about reference—roughly, that
when we pass from using a referring expression to talking explicitly about what that
expression refers to, we continue to talk about the same thing. So if we are to count
predicates as referring expressions,12 it must correspondingly be true that when we
pass from referring to something using a predicate to explicitly speaking of what
that predicate refers to, we continue to talk about the same thing; and it must be
possible to capture this for any particular predicate, as (i) captures this for the term
‘Julius Caesar’. It must be possible, that is, to furnish a disquotation sentence that is
to ‘n is a horse’, for example, as (i) is to ‘Julius Caesar’. However, if ‘refers to’ in
discourse about predicate reference is to be understood as ‘n refers to f’, Trueman
thinks, it would not be possible to furnish any such sentence. For in that case, ‘the
referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’ would indeed be the singular term it appears to be, but
then in order to state an analogue of (i) for ‘n is a horse’ we would have to express
the thought that something referred to with that singular term is identical to
something referred to with a predicate, ‘n is a horse’. That is, we would have to
express an object-property identity. So we are confronted once more with the above
argument that this cannot be done. We cannot use the predicate ‘n is a horse’ to pick
out the property whose identity with a certain object we wish to express: the sense
of the identity predicate prohibits that. So we would have to resort to the use of a co-
11 I shall assume, in Fregean spirit, that if ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’ is the definite description it
appears to be, it is a referring expression and is not to be analysed in Russellian fashion.
12 It is, of course, far from uncontroversial that we are to count predicates as referring expressions; but I
shall follow Trueman (2015, §2) in assuming that, in some significant sense, at least some predicates do
refer. We will shortly see that Trueman himself presents an argument to the effect that, in another
significant sense, predicates do not refer.
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referring singular term in its stead; but no singular term we choose will be fit for the
expression of our target thought: even if the term we select refers to the property, it
will not present its referent as a property, as would be required to express the
thought.
The possibility of giving an analogue of (i) for a predicate can only be secured,
Trueman thinks, if the relational expression for predicate reference permits us to
specify what a predicate refers to using a predicate—that is, if ‘refers to’ for
predicates is to be understood as ‘n refers to U’ (where ‘U’ marks an argument place
open to predicates). There is no uncontroversial rendering of ‘n refers to U’,
Trueman acknowledges13; but unless talk of predicates referring can be interpreted
in this way, he thinks, an essential feature of reference, captured in the case of terms
by the likes of (i), cannot even be said to obtain in the case of predicates. However,
we cannot understand ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’ as the result of using a definite
description operator to bind a term variable in the argument place of ‘‘‘n is a horse’’
refers to U’, because only a predicate variable could be bound in that argument
place. Trueman notes that we may wish to countenance
… a higher-level definite description operator which binds (first-level)
predicate variables rather than term variables; such an operator would take a
second-level predicate and return a first-level predicate standing for the unique
property which satisfies that second-level predicate, if there is such a unique
property. We could then use this operator to form a higher-level definite
description by binding the variable in ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to U’, which we
could write as ‘the F such that ‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to F’. But crucially, ‘the
F such that ‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to F’ would itself be a predicate, and so we
could no more plug it into the gap in ‘n = the property horse’, which is a gap
for singular terms, than we could plug ‘n is a horse’ into that gap. (Trueman
2015, §5)
Thus, Trueman thinks, with ‘refers to’ for predicates understood as it must be, the
appearance that ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’ is a singular term presenting its
referent as a property dissolves.
3 Initial reflections
Oddly, Trueman does not actually deliver the predicate analogue of (i) that is
allegedly only available if the relational expression for predicate reference takes a
predicate in accusative position. This omission can be remedied, however, using
resources he accepts. We’ve just seen Trueman countenance a second-level
analogue of the definite description operator; later in the paper he follows Frege in
countenancing a second-level analogue of the identity predicate, which takes a
predicate in each of its argument places and which I shall notate ‘=2’. (As with ‘n
13 One candidate, Trueman notes, is Dummett’s ‘Vx(x is what n refers to $ Ux)’, where the ‘is’ therein is
meant to be the ‘is’ of predication rather than identity (Dummett 1981, p. 217).
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refers to U’, there is no uncontroversial rendering of ‘=2’. Frege favoured
‘Vx(Ux $Wx)’; Trueman suggests ‘hVx(Ux $Wx)’.) Using the second-level
analogues of the identity predicate and the definite description operator, an analogue
of (i) for ‘n is a horse’ may be given as follows:
(ii) The F such that ‘n is a horse’ refers to F = 2 is a horse.
The admission of a second-level analogue of the identity predicate opens up a
possibility for pursuing the second of the two kinds of objection mentioned at the start
of Sect. 2.2. Specifically, it presents the option, not discussed in Trueman’s paper, of
stating Benno’s thought using ‘=2’ in conjunction with two predicates. Using ‘=2’, we
could employ ‘n is a horse’ itself to pick out the property to be identified with an object,
rather than a surrogate singular term. Of course, this strategy of stating Benno’s
thought as a higher-level identity confronts a mirror image of the problem set out in
Sect. 2.1: a singular term cannot fill an argument place of ‘=2’, only a predicate; so in
this case it is requisite to use a surrogate predicate to pick out the object we wish to
identify with a property. But whichever predicate we select, Trueman will presumably
claim, it will not present its referent as an object; so the resulting second-level identity
sentence will fail to express Benno’s thought. The challenge, if we are to maintain that
Benno’s thought can be expressed with a second-level identity sentence, is to find a
predicate that presents its referent as an object, just as the challenge, if we are to
maintain that Benno’s thought can be expressed with a first-level identity sentence, is
to find a term that presents its referent as a property. I hope to show in Sect. 4 that both
of these challenges can be met, that Benno’s thought is accordingly susceptible of
expression either as a first- or as a second-level identity claim, and hence that
Trueman’s case against singular reference to properties fails.
First, though, I want to raise a lesser objection to Trueman’s argument: the
argument does not, I submit, establish that it is nonsense to say that a property is an
object; at most it establishes the disjunctive thesis that it is either nonsense or false
to say that a property is an object. This disjunction of the nonsensicality and
impossibility theses would still be a remarkable result. If Trueman were to have
established the disjunction, he would have succeeded in ruling out singular
reference to concepts (as either impossible or unintelligible). Nevertheless, it is
worth making clear that, for all Trueman has shown, saying that a property is an
object may at least escape the ignominious fate of being not even wrong. This
emerges from an observation that will also provide inspiration in Sect. 4: even
granting Trueman’s claim that ‘‘‘refers’ for predicates must be read as ‘n refers to
U’’’ (Trueman 2015, §5), we can still insert the name of a predicate into the first
argument place of ‘n refers to f’; and when the second argument place is also filled
with a singular term, the result will, at least, make sense. The sense of ‘n refers to f’
is only such as to require that the expressions introduced into its argument places
have the characteristic kind of sense possessed by singular terms14; the name of a
14 Might it be objected that ‘n refers to f’ semantically requires more of the expressions admitted into its
argument places than that they have the sense of singular terms? Perhaps: the introduction of certain
singular terms into the first argument place of ‘n refers to f’ will produce sentences that might seem to be
category mistakes—e.g. ‘The Baltic Sea refers to Socrates’—and there are those who have wished to
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predicate has that kind of sense.15 The sentence ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to Socrates’,
for example, is perfectly meaningful. In that case, so is the generalization ‘Ax(x is a
predicate ^ x refers to Socrates)’, as is its modalization ‘eAx(x is a predicate ^
x refers to Socrates)’. The conjunction
(iii) eAx(x is a predicate ^ x refers to Socrates) ^ eAy(y is a singular term ^
y refers to Socrates)
must also make sense, since there is no doubt about the meaningfulness of the latter
conjunct. Moreover, the result of existentially generalizing this conjunction in the
position of ‘Socrates’ also makes sense:
(iv) Az(eAx(x is a predicate ^ x refers to z) ^eAy(y is a singular term ^ y refers to
z))
However, given the way in which ‘object’ and ‘property’ were introduced, (iv) is a
very natural reading of ‘A property is an object’. So there is a very natural way of
taking ‘A property is an object’ on which it is perfectly meaningful.16 What, then, is
the import of Trueman’s claim that ‘refers’ for predicates must be read as ‘n refers
to U’? This: when we speak of predicates referring, it is a condition of the truth of
what we say (not the meaningfulness of what we say) that ‘refers’ mean ‘n refers to
U’. Thus, the complaint against (iv) to which Trueman is entitled is not that it is
nonsense, but that it is false—false because nothing satisfies the predicate ‘eAx(x is
a predicate ^ x refers to n)’.
These considerations also bear upon the interpretation of ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a
horse’’’ and the possibility of employing this expression to articulate Benno’s
Footnote 14 continued
classify category mistakes as nonsense. However, firstly, it is not clear that the likes of ‘The Baltic Sea
refers to Socrates’ really are category mistakes, at least if a category mistake represents an attempt to
ascribe a property to an object that is of the wrong the kind to exemplify that property. After all, can’t any
object, in principle, serve as a name (see e.g. Lewis 1986, p. 145–6)? If so, the Baltic Sea is not of the
wrong kind to instantiate the property of referring to Socrates. Secondly, there is a strong case to be made
against the view that category mistakes are nonsense (see Magidor 2009; Magidor 2013), and the
popularity of the view has certainly waned. Thirdly, even if there were categorial restrictions on the kind
of thing a name of which can meaningfully appear in the first argument place of ‘n refers to n’—
restrictions that exclude objects like the Baltic Sea—those restrictions would have to be very stringent to
exclude predicates: a predicate is a linguistic expression; is a linguistic expression not the kind of thing
that can refer to Socrates, for example? Though I cannot address these issues in detail, I think this suffices
to indicate the difficulties confronting the view that names of predicates cannot be meaningfully sub-
stituted for ‘n’ in ‘n refers to f’.
15 I am, of course, here assuming that predicates can be named—i.e. that predicates are objects. Trueman
also makes this assumption, though he evinces a suspicion that it is false (Trueman 2015, fn. 11). I shall
only say that this is not a suspicion I share. Some commentators, of whom Geach is a notable example
(Geach 1976b, pp. 59–61), (Geach 1961, p. 144), (Geach 1976a, p. 440)), have maintained that Frege
himself deemed this assumption false and conceived of incomplete expressions (of which predicates are a
species) as linguistic functions mapping singular terms or sentences to singular terms or sentences. I think
these commentators are wrong. Several things Frege says indicate that he conceived of incomplete
expressions as objects—e.g. Frege (1980, p. 136).
16 ‘A property is identical to some object’ would be more naturally read as
‘Az Av (eAx (x is a predicate ^ x refers to z) ^ eAy(y is a singular term ^ y refers to v) ^ z = v)’.
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thought. This expression can be interpreted as the result of first inserting the
predicate name ‘‘‘n is a horse’’’ into the first argument place of ‘n refers to f’, and
then using a definite description operator to bind a term variable in the argument
place of the resulting predicate, ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to f’. Moreover, if ‘the
referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’, thus interpreted, were to refer, it would, in one sense,
present its referent as something to which a predicate can refer. Letting ‘refers1’
mean ‘n refers to f’ and ‘refers2’ mean ‘n refers to U’, ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a
horse’’’, thus construed, would present its referent as something to which a predicate
can refer1. Moreover, if ‘referred’ in the stipulation, ‘a property is anything that can
be referred to with a predicate’ (Trueman 2015, §2), is understood to be ‘referred1’,
the resulting sense of ‘property’ is one on which ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’, as
presently construed, would present its referent as a property. Let ‘property1’ mean
‘property’ in this sense. If Benno’s thought concerns the property1 referred to by ‘n
is a horse’, there is, then, no problem in presenting it as such with a singular term,
and therewith identifying it with an object, as follows: the referent of ‘n is a
horse’ = the property horse. But the import of Trueman’s claim that ‘refers’ for
predicates must be read as ‘n refers to U’ is that (a) there is no property1 referred to
by ‘n is a horse’, since (b) there are no properties1 at all, because predicates do not
refer1, and hence (c) ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’, on its present reading, lacks a
referent, as ‘n is a horse’, in particular, does not refer1. It does not follow that ‘the
referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’ = the property horse’ is nonsense, but the emptiness of
the singular term left-flanking the identity sign renders the sentence at least untrue, a
fate shared by Benno’s thought if this sentence indeed expresses it.
4 In defense of singular reference to concepts
4.1 How to state object-property identities I: second-level operators
If Benno’s thought is to be neither inexpressible nor untrue, what appears to be
requisite is a singular term that presents its referent as something to which a
predicate can refer2. I propose that there is a way of construing ‘the referent of ‘‘n is
a horse’’’, neglected in Trueman’s paper, on which this expression is just such a
singular term. This expression cannot, we have seen, be understood as the result of
applying the standard term-variable-binding definite description operator to the
predicate ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to U’: the argument place of this predicate cannot
accommodate a term variable. But nor can it be understood, if it is to be singular
term, as the result of applying to this predicate the second-level definite description
operator Trueman countenances in the quotation at the end of Sect. 2.2: though this
operator can bind a predicate variable in the argument place of ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers
to U’, it produces a predicate, not a singular term. However, these two operators do
not, I submit, exhaust our options. In addition to a term-variable-binding, term-
forming operator and a predicate-variable-binding, predicate-forming operator, we
can recognize a predicate-variable-binding, term-forming operator—one that
(roughly) yields a complex name of the unique value of the predicate variable it
binds (if there is one) that satisfies the relevant second-level predicate. This operator
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would, firstly, be fit to bind a variable in the argument place of the second-level
predicate ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to U’; secondly, produce, when applied to that
second-level predicate, a singular term that co-refers with ‘n is a horse’; and thirdly,
produce, crucially, a singular term that presents its referent as a property in the
required sense—that is, as something to which a predicate might refer2. If there is
such an operator, ‘the referent of ‘‘n is a horse’’’ may be understood as the result of
applying this operator to the second-level predicate ‘‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to U’.
If Trueman’s argument is to go through, therefore, he requires that there can be
no such operator. But what reason have we to preclude such a term-forming
operator? Needless to say, variable-binding operators need not yield expressions of
the same logical type as the variables they bind.17 Prima facie, the term-forming
operator seems just as intelligible as the predicate-forming operator Trueman
recognises. Neither operator is readily rendered in English (though I note that ‘the
F such that ‘‘n is a horse’’ refers to F’ is much more straightforwardly heard as a
singular term than a predicate).
Are there any grounds for denouncing the operator I propose? There is at least
one reason one might be concerned about it. Let’s introduce some notation for the
two predicate-variable-binding operators now on the table. Let Ip be the higher-level
definite description operator Trueman recognizes (the subscript indicating that it is
predicate-forming) and let It be the higher-level operator I propose that we
recognize (the subscript indicating that it is term-forming). Call an Ip-predicate any
predicate that results from binding a predicate variable in the argument place of a
second-level predicate with Ip. Similarly, call an It-term any term that results from
binding a predicate variable in the argument place of a second-level predicate with
It. The proposal is to state the desired object-property identity, Benno’s thought, as
follows:
(v) It F (‘n is a horse’ refers to U) = the property horse.
Here is the concern.18 If we are to introduce It then we shall have to state its
semantics. That means giving a principle that settles, given an arbitrary It-term, to
what it refers. In the case of the standard definite description operator—which we
now symbolize as i —we give some such principle as the following:
(vi) For all x (‘ix(Fx)’ refers to x iff for all y (Fy iff x = y)).
17 More than one predicate-variable-binding, term-forming operator appears in Frege’s own work.
Firstly, since he thinks that sentences are names, the second-order quantifiers, on Frege’s analysis, will
surely count as such operators. Secondly, Frege will presumably want to recognise a second-level
counterpart to his first-level notation for the value-range of a first-level function. The first-level notation
features an operator (a Greek letter with a smooth breathing) that binds a first-order variable (the same
letter without the smooth breathing) in the argument place of a function expression. Applied to ‘f’ the
operator yields a name of the value-range of f0—viz. ‘e9 f (e)’. See Frege (1997b, p. 136–7). The second-
level counterpart of this notation will feature an operator that binds a function variable (e.g. a predicate
variable) in the argument place of a second-level function expression ‘Q’, and yields a name of the value-
range of Q. This operator will thus be both predicate-variable-binding and term-forming.
18 I’m grateful to Robert Trueman for impressing the following kind of worry upon me in
correspondence.
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Roughly, this tells us that the result of applying i to a first-level predicate ‘Fn’ refers
to any object, and only that object, that uniquely satisfies ‘Fn’. Likewise, in the case
of Ip we can give the following principle for an arbitrary Ip-predicate:
(vii) For all F (‘Ip F(QF)’ refers to F iff for all G (QG iff G = 2F)).
Roughly, this tells us that the result of applying Ip to a second-level predicate, ‘QU’,
refers to any property, and only that property, that uniquely satisfies ‘QU’.
However, we run into difficulty when we attempt to state a corresponding principle
for It. The temptation is to offer something like the following:
(viii) For all x (‘It F(QF)’ refers to x iff for all G (QG iff G = x)).
But, of course, this is nonsense: no sense has been given to ‘=’ that would permit it
to receive a predicate (variable or constant) into one argument place and a singular
term (variable or constant) into the other. So then how are we to give the intended
semantics of It?
A more promising attempt to state a corresponding principle for It is as follows:
(ix) For all F (‘It F(QF)’ refers to F iff for all G (QG iff G = 2F).
In the left-hand clause of the bi-conditional, ‘refers to’ is ‘n refers to U’. This might
seem aberrant, since ‘ItF(QF)’ is intended to be a singular term, not a predicate.
However, there is, of course, no syntactic obstacle to our inserting the name of a
singular term into the first argument place of ‘n refers to U’, and the results of doing
so are perfectly meaningful, just as—we saw in Sect. 3—the results of inserting the
name of a predicate into the first argument place of ‘n refers to f’ are perfectly
meaningful. Note that the strategy of inserting the name of a singular term into the
first argument place of ‘n refers to U’ also affords a way of pursuing the neglected
approach mentioned in Sect. 3: expressing an object-property identity using two
predicates in conjunction with the second-level analogue of the identity predicate. In
particular, it seems to enable us to produce a predicate that presents its referent as an
object. We may insert, for example, ‘the property horse’—the name of an object
with which we wish to identify a property—into the first argument place of ‘n refers
to U’. To the predicate that results—‘‘‘the property horse’’ refers to U’—we may
then apply the predicate-forming operator Ip to yield: ‘IpF (‘‘the property horse’’
refers to F)’. This predicate appears to present its referent as something to which
singular reference can be made, and to allow us to state the desired object-property
identity as follows:
(x) Ip F (‘the property horse’ refers to F) = 2 is a horse.
The concern, though, about inserting the name of a singular term into the first
argument place of ‘n refers to U’, and thus about the proposed strategies for stating
the It operator’s semantics and articulating Benno’s thought with the higher-level
identity sentence, (x), will be this: Trueman’s argument that ‘refers’ in talk of
predicates referring must be read as ‘n refers to U’ will be paralleled by an argument
that ‘refers’ in talk of singular terms referring must be read as ‘n refers to f’. In
brief: it is only possible to state a disquotation sentence, like (i), for a singular term
using ‘n refers to f’, not ‘n refers to U’.
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However, I believe we now have the resources to reply to this argument and to
vindicate the use of ‘n refers to U’ in speaking of singular terms referring. The
challenge is to formulate a disquotational identity, analogous to (i), for a singular
term, using ‘n refers to U’. Letting ‘a’ be a singular term, I propose that the
following meets this challenge:
(xi) It F (‘a’ refers to F) = a.
We here employ our term-forming operator It to form a term that picks out the
unique property to which ‘a’ refers—if there is such a property—and say that that
property is identical to a. The reference predicate we use is ‘n refers to U’.
The reader will have noticed that there is a circularity here: we have sought to
vindicate the use of ‘n refers to U’ to specify the referent of a singular term, by
giving a disquotational identity that makes use of the It operator; and we gave the
semantics of It using a principle—(ix)—that itself uses ‘n refers to U’ to specify the
referent of a singular term. However, I simply see no reason to think that this
circularity is vicious. It is certainly not generally to be expected that the semantics
for an expression may be given in a manner completely devoid of circularity.
Absent a reason for thinking the circularity in this particular instance a cause for
concern, I conclude that the use of ‘n refers to U’ in speaking of singular terms
referring satisfies Trueman’s requirement concerning the possibility of stating
disquotation sentences.
I have now adduced two methods of expressing Benno’s thought, each exploiting
a second-level variable-binding operator: firstly, with the first-level identity
sentence, (v), using It; and secondly, with the second-level identity sentence (x),
using Ip. So far, no reason has been given to doubt that these methods succeed.
4.2 How to state object-property identities II: first-level operators
Having recognized a predicate-variable-binding, term-forming operator in addition
to a term-variable-binding, term-forming operator and a predicate-variable-binding,
predicate-forming operator, it is natural to complete the square and recognize a
term-variable-binding, predicate-forming operator. This first-level operator, which
we symbolise ip, binds a term variable in the argument place of a first-level
predicate and, informally, yields a predicate referring to the unique value of that
term variable (if there is one) that satisfies that first-level predicate. The semantics
for ip, can more formally be captured by the following principle:
(xii) For all x (‘ipx(Fx)’ refers to x iff for all y (Fy iff x = y)).
‘ipx(Fx)’ is a predicate, and the principle tells us, intuitively, that it is a predicate
whose referent is the unique object that satisfies the predicate ‘Fn’. But since it is a
predicate, (xii) involves the appearance of a predicate in the first argument place of
‘n refers to f’. Surely this falls foul of Trueman’s argument that ‘refers’ in talk of
predicates referring must be read as ‘n refers to U’?
However, I believe we now have the resources to reply to this argument and to
vindicate the use of ‘n refers to f’ in speaking of predicates referring. The challenge
is to formulate a disquotational identity, analogous to (i), for a predicate, using ‘n
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refers to f’. Letting ‘Fn’ be a predicate, I propose that the following meets this
challenge:
(xiii) ip x (‘Fn’ refers to x) = 2 F.
We here employ our predicate-forming operator ip to form a predicate that picks out
the unique object to which ‘Fn’ refers—if there is such an object—and flank the
second-level analogue of the identity sign with this predicate and the disquoted
predicate ‘Fn’. The reference predicate we use is ‘n refers to f’.
We find a circularity here, parallel to the circularity involved in our vindication
of the use of ‘n refers to U’ in speaking of singular terms referring: we seek to
vindicate the use of ‘n refers to f’ in speaking of predicates referring, by giving a
disquotational identity that makes use of the ip operator; and we gave the semantics
of ip using a principle—(xii)—that itself uses ‘n refers to f’ to specify the referent of
a predicate. But again, I just see no reason to think that this circularity is in any way
pathological. I conclude that the use of ‘n refers to f’ in speaking of predicates
referring satisfies Trueman’s requirement concerning the possibility of stating
disquotation sentences.
Having recognized the ip operator and vindicated the use of ‘n refers to f’ for
predicates, we are, I submit, afforded two further methods for stating Benno’s
thought. Firstly, we may use the ip operator to construct a predicate that presents its
referent as an object: ‘ip x (‘the property horse’ refers to x)’. Therewith, we may
formulate Benno’s thought as the following second-level identity:
(xiv) ip x (‘the property horse’ refers to x) = 2 is a horse.
Secondly, we may use the ordinary definite description operator to construct a singular
term that presents its referent as a property: ‘i x (‘n is a horse’ refers to x)’. Therewith,
Benno’s thought can be naturally stated as the following first-level identity:
(xv) i x (‘n is a horse’ refers to x) = the property horse.
Exploiting the first-level operators i and ip, we can, I conclude, again either express
Benno’s thought as a first-level identity claim or as a second-level identity claim.
5 Conclusion
I hope to have established that, pace Trueman’s argument, Benno’s thought does
admit of expression. It can be expressed, I claim, as a first-level identity, using (v) or
(xv), or as a second-level identity, using (x) or (xiv). Benno’s thought was just an
arbitrary object-property identity, so I conclude that it is possible to express object-
property identities. If I am right, Trueman has failed to establish that it is nonsense
to say, generally, that a property is identical to some object. But nor has he has
established that it is false to say so: for no reason has been given for thinking that
(v), (xv), (x) and (xiv), each of which can be understood as instances of this
existential generalization, are false. I hold, then, that singular reference to
properties/concepts survives Trueman’s assault. If the Fregean position is to be
upheld, justification must be sought elsewhere.
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